Abstract
2 Default logic for natural language semantlcs 2.1 Introduction to default logic A default rule has the following general form:
The meaning of this deduction rule is that given x such that. P is true, if there are no contradiction to R being true in the current world, then infer C. P is called the prerequisite and C is the conclusion. R is a condition which has to be coherent with the current world. Such a rule can be used to represent general laws or statements such as:
Most ravens are black. The difference between general lawn and contingent state--ments is however fundanmntal but it cannot be captured straightforwardly within default logic. Indeed, in the first example, blackness is taken as a property inherent to ravens, not completely based on observation but also on induction. Default logic permits this property to remain inherent to ravens even if there are exceptions. The second sentence is strictly based on observation and is valid only on a certain time interval t at a given location 1. The distinction between contingent facts and general laws can however be context-dependent. Suppose the above sentence is stated in the context of a factory work~ ing 24 hours every day then the fact that lights are on can be interpreted as a law imposed, for instance, for security reasons, There is another difference: the first sentence may be true even if there are no ravens in the current world whereas the second sentence requires a non-empty denotation for the part of noun phrase following most, in other terms, the presence in our example of at least two lights.
Default logic permits to assign a property (C) to a precise individual in a given world, modulo some coherence conditions (R). This can be contrasted with filzzy and probabilistic 10g.= ics where a set of individuals is characterized as a whole by a property. Thus, no property can be deduced for a given indi.-viduM in this set with a full degree of certainty. Our choice of default logic is then motivated by the need of being able to make inferences about a precise individual and to provide precise responses. This does not exclude fuzzy and probabilistie logics, but it simply has different motivations and uses.
Using default logic also permits to skip over some recalcitrant representational problems of fuzzy logic, but, on the other hand, it cannot take into account slight differences between, for example:
Most birds fly Versus Almost all birds tty. A majority of birds fly versus A high majority of birds Ay.
The question however is to know what is the real nature of the difference between those statements and if it is more than a connotative meaning.
At a formal level, it turns out that additional inferential patterns can be formulated when using default reasoning. Furthermore, due to a certain stability, a default rule used in a semantic representation of a sentence confers to this representation useful properties~in a knowledge base context such as: conservativity, extensibility and some forms of monotonicity. Because of their generality and stability, default rules can also play a prominent role to restore consistency in knowledge bases.
2.2
Classes of words and constructions represented by default logic
In a sentence, a wide diversity of types of words and linguistic constructions confer a certain degree of generality (either contingent or permanent) to the statement in which they are included. In this class fall words like context-dependent determiners, qnantiflcational adverbs, propositional adjectives and adverbs and some very specific adjectives (worse, perfect, ideal,...). Constructions like superlatives and some agentless passive constructions also belong to this class. It turns out that these words or constructions can be represented in a number of contexts with a greater precision and adequacy by default logic. We now briefly examine some simple examples. A context-dependent determiner in a situation where it has a relative meaning cannot in general be represented by default logic. By relative meaning, we mean, for example, sentences where the context-dependent determiner is in the scope of a quantification introducing distributivity:
Context-dependent determiners
The owners of several cars pay an additional tax. Relative meaning can also be introduced by an implicit restriction on the set of instances refered to, as in:
John met many people to-day. ~her~ the set of people that John can meet in a day is imp~'ieit~y r~stricted to a (small) subset of all the people in the curxent world.
The latter example shows that default logic cannot be used to represent determiners where the set of elements refered to by the noun phrase following that determiner is restricted by a constituent outside that noun phrase. Futhermore, th~tele-ment introducing the restriction can be explicit (e.g. t~lay) or implicit as in:
John ate many apples. where the set of apples in which John ate many apples can be implicitlyrestricted by the context (e.g. in the basked, in the frig...) or by the semantics of the verb to eat (a human cannot eat more than a certain quantity of food per day). An informal criterion to determine whether a determiner can be represented by default logic is to substitute all or no respectively for most, many.., and few and to check if it is possible to build a coherent world from the cnrent world with less exceptions (i.e. a more uniform world as in [Delgrande 87]) so that the universally quantified statement is true. If there is such a world then the original determiner can be represented by a default rule.
For example, consider the sentence: John met many people to-day. uttered in a world where John is the manager of a company, people refers to the staff of the company and John met everybody in the company except n people (n being small). If we substitute all for many, we obtain the sentence:
John met all people to-day. and if we can build a consistent world W' from W where John met those n people in addition to the others then many can be represented by a default rule.
If John is a politician and people refers to the people who want to vote for him (suppose this number is large), then it is not possible to consistently build a world in which John met every people in a single day, in particular if those people are scattered throughout the whole country. In this latter case, many cannot be represented by a default rule.
Quantiflcationa] adverbs
Adverbs introducing a form of universality or contributing to it can originate a default logic based representation:
John sings rarely. Mary is incidentally (very rarely) on time.
John meets Sue almost every day.
John often travels by bus rather than by subway in Paris. For default logic to be used, the concept or the quality modified by the adverb has to be countable and quantifiable. The first example can be paraphrased as:
At most times t (or preferably, on most time intervals t), by default John does not sing.
The representation of sentence 2 requires the use of events and is far more complex. Roughly speaking, we can paraphrase this sentence by:
In most eases when Mary has something to do, she does it later than the scheduled time for this work.
This can be formulated in an equiwlent way in terms of default rule. If el is the event associated with the scheduled time for the beginning of the activity and if e2 is the event of Mary beginning to do this activity, then if there is no contradiction with e2 > el then infer that e2 > el.
Sentence 3 requires events to be associated with, for example, a date and a duration. It can be paraphrased by:
If it is not inconsistent that John meets Sue to-day (e.g. John is in the same location as Sue, etc...) , then infer that there is a time interwl t during which John meets Sue.
Various factors llke temporal factors can restrict the scope of a default:
From 8 to 10 am, Mary is very rarely in her omce.
but they still have a universal meaning over that restricted domain.
Adjectives
Adjectives in the superlative, in particular when the statement is not absolutely incompatible with a small number of exceptions can be represented by a default rule. This permits to avoid a too strong and definitive formulation. Consider:
The Mon~-Blanc is (one of) the highest mountains. Represe:fl;ing this sentence by default logic permits:
s to assume that a mountain whose elevation is unknown is lower than the Moat-Blanc, s to accept without introducing inconsistencies that there are mountains with an elevation explicitly known and greater than the Mont-Blanc elevation.
This approach is particularly relevant for superlatives: it turns out indeed that most superlatives are not completely universal. They are often true in a coherent subset of the current world.
In the same range of ideas, adjectives such as ideal, worse of perfect turn out to be, in most contexts, implicit superlatives ranging over several properties. In:
Jim is the ideal hiker. idea] couht mean that Jim has most of the qualities of a hiker in something close to the superlative. Thus, such a sentence can be represented by a conjunction of properties in the superlative, each of them being separately represented by a default rule.
The range of properties refered to by adjectives llke ideal or worse can be restricted (or a specific property can be emphasized) as in:
Mary is the worse person to work with: she is (almost) never on time.
where the quality refered to is to be never on time. In this case, the representation becomes much simpler.
Agentless passive constructions
Agentless passive constructions of verbs like to admire, to hate, to neglect or ~o laugth at, in some contexts lend very well themselves to a representation with defaults. For example, a sentence like:
Mary is admired. can be paraphrased by: Most persons who know Mary admire her.
Propositional adverbs and adjectives
Adverbs and adjectives such as probable, likely, unlikely and certainly in some contexts modify the certainty of a statement, as in the sentence:
It is unlikely that computer science students know baroque music composers. These adverbs and adjectives are basically interpreted with an intensional meaning. However, representing them by default logic is also very relevant if we do not want to stress only on the likelihood of the statement but if we also want to have a more precise reading, for example if we want to state that:
If X is a computer science student and if it is not consistent to say that X does not know any baroque music composer then infer that X does not know any baroque music composer. An interesting problem at this level would be to investigate the possibility of using default reasoning paired with intensionality. Using possible world semantics could be a mean to solve this problem, but this is still unclear to us.
Integrating default logic into Generalized Quantiflers
In the examples we have given above, we have restricted our attention to the most straightforward uses of default logic. In particular, the expressions or concepts used are:
• completely defined (no pronominal references, ...),
• extensional,
• discrete (no continuous uses as in "a lot of snow").
None of these restrictions are, however, essential. Another more important restriction is that universes are supposed to be finite at each time t, in order to make our notations below computationally tractable.
3.1
Generalized quantifiers
To deal with semantic representations, we adopt the spirit of the Generalized Quantifiers framework [Barwise and Cooper 81] . This approach is, in fact, of much interest because it is quite close to current research in knowledge bases. A generalized quantifier Q denotes a relation among sets of entities in a world W. It is noted as: QAB where A and B are linguistic expressions or their settheoretic equivalents. For example:
All ravens are black is noted as:
AU (ravens) (are black).
All establishes a relation between the set of ravens and the set of entities which are black. . In Generalized Quantifiers, determiners are studied in a principled way by looking at their semantic properties. This study appears to have enough logical foundations to motiw~.tc theoretical investigations. Generalized Quantifiers also turn out not to be limited to representing determiners but extends to the semantics of other structures such as conditionals [Van Benthem 86] .
We now turn to informally introduce default logic into the Generalized Quantifiers framework. A default rule is basically used to conclude a formula C for a given entity e, satisfying a prerequisite P, modulo R, However, it is also possible to characterize the set E of elements e satisfying P and for which C can be concluded modulo the coherence control on 1L If we view a default rule as a ternary relation:
by-def P R (7. or, simply as a binary relation since, in our context, R and C are identical:
by-def P C.
then [[ P ]lw and I[ C ]
[w can be defined and the above relation is a relation among sets of individuals over world W in a way similar Vo the determiners accounted for within the Generalized Quantiflers framework. In addition, a third set should be mentioned, which is the set of exceptions:
which introduces another interesting type of relation, out of the scope of the present contribution.
Some examples
As an illustration, we now present possible representations for some of the examples given above in the previous section. Those representations have a knowhdge-base orientation rather than a pure formal semantics one. v (z=Y))), z=x ).
This logical representation means that if John travels by Z which can be either a bus or a subway (X or Y), then, by default, John travels by bus (i.e. by X).
(
f) The Mont-Blane is one Of the highest mountains. is represented as follows: by-def((mountain(X) A -,(X = mont-blanc) A elevation(X,Y) A elevation(mont-blanc,M)), Y < M ).
(g) Mary is admired. is represented by: by-def(to-know (X,mary),to-admire(X,mary)). We could also add that X has the ability to admire.
Stability of statements represented by default rules
By stability of a statement, we mean the characterization of conditions under which a statement remains true when the current world is updated. In our framework, stability means the characterization of the conditions under which the set of elements x that satisfy by-def A B remains unchanged, i.e. any deduction made from that default rule for any individual x before the updating remains true after the updating. Representations with defaults appear to have slightly different properties than their more classical counterparts. Among those properties, we now present some of those which are of much interest to knowledge representation systems. The properties listed below are central to the field of Generalized Quantifiers.
Conservativity
For all A, B being linguistic expressions (or their set-theoretlc equivalents):
by-def A B ~ by-def A (.4 A B) (noted CONS)
The equivalence is straightforward in virtue of the very nature of the prerequisite A.
4.2

Extension
Let us first introduce the notion of irrelevance. The idea is that propositions irrelevant to a default statement should have }.
consistentw(S) is a predicate which is true if in world W the statement S is consistent.
If W contains disjunctions of formulae, then it is necessary to consider all maximal extensions E of W to define rightirrelevance. The following condition has to be true:
For all E, maximal extension of W such that: Not surprisingly (default logic is a non-monotonic logic), upward monotonicity does not hold in general.
Inferential patterns
Some inferential patterns within Generalized Quantifiers [Vesterstahl 84, 85] , [Van Benthem 86] also hold, with some restrictions, for default logic. Some additional patterns can be formulated, given the specificities of default logic. These patterns permit to derive new rules from previous ones and to generate new linguistic expressions. Here are some simple, basic inferential patterns:
Restricted transitivity
For all A, B, C linguistic expressions:
(is B), (all B), ... are recta-linguistic expressions corresponding to well-formed linguistic expressions explicitly containing the verb to be or the determiner all. This inferential pattern can be used, for instance, to deduce (2) from (1):
(1) Most animals are mammals and All mammals feed their babies.
(2) Most animals feed their babies.
via the following instanciation of the pattern: by-def(an~mal(A),mammal(A)) A (ali(A'),nmmmal(A') A (baby-of(B,A') A to-fecd (A',B) )) ==~ by-def(an2mai(A), baby-of(B,A) A to-feed (A,B) ). Notice that A' is bound to A in the consequent, because the two formulae are merged.
The denotation of B need not be included in the denotation of A. For example:
Most workers are union members and All union members are on strike entail: Mast workers are on strike.
Here is another restricted transitivity pattern:
• (by-def X (is B)) A ((no B) C) ~ (by-clef A -I C). Notice that in the patterns already stated, the determiner at the origin of the default remains unchanged in the conclusion.
Finally, here is the last restricted transitivity pattern:
• ((all A) (are B)) A (by-def B C) ==~ (by-def A C).
Then, for example: (5) All raammals are animals and Most animals are vegetarians entails (6) Most mammals are vegetarians.
This latter pattern is however weaker than the previous ones. Nothing, indeed, excludes that there exist models M~ in which no n~mnnals are vegetarians since in the premises nothing is said about the intersection of the set of mammals and the set of vegetarians. If the intersection is empty, then the default rule will simply be never applied. In the premises of the three tlrst inferential patterns, there is a guarantee that the intersection of The determiner some is more neutral and will be prefered in this type of situation.
5.2
Distrlbutivity
If B and C are independent properties then:
(hy-def A (B A C) ==~ (by-def A B) A (by-def A C) (by.-def A B) ==~ (by-clef A C). Thus, for example: Most workers own a car and are married entails: Most workers own a car and Most workers are married. The reverse pattern: (by-def A B) A (by-defX' C) ~ by-def A (B A C) where A' is a copy of A with different variables, also holds but it is somewhat weaker in the sense that the denotation of B A C ill W is included in the denotation of B in W and in that of C in W. Thus, the same remark as for the previous pattern holds: the determiner at the origin of the default rule in the pre~rdses is not preserved and another context-dependent determiner can be more appropriate, depending on how much the default has been weaken, i.e. on how much the number of exceptions to the default rule has increased. This number is characterized by the cardinal of the following set: In this case, we also adopt the determiner some as a neutral representation. A quantifier Q observes contrapasition iff Q is of the form: 'at most k A are not B'.
5.3
Contraposition
in the sense that (1) k is not implicitly intended to be quite small (with respect to the size of the world) and (2) k can be null. In fact, the value of k turns out to be irrelevant since each time a default rule is used a test of coherence is made on a formula. This latter result can also be used to build passive forms from their affirmative counterparts.
5.5
Subalternacy From complex relations holding between different classes of determiners, the property of subalternaey has emerged and turns out to be relevant for statements represented by default logic. This property states that:
For all A, B, by-def A B ==~ ~ by-def A (A A -1 B). For the same reasons as above, this expression can be simplified and becomes:
by-def A B ~ -~ by-def A -~ B.
(10) Most birds fly entails (11) It is false that most birds cannot fly. or, using eontrapasition and if few is the opposite of most: (12) Few birds does not fly.
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Epilogue
Default logic permits to represent with a greater accuracy and relevance several types of words and constructions. We have proposed here to integrate it into the formal framework of Generalized Quantifiers. Default logic also exhibits a number of particular properties at the level of the characterization of the truth persistence of a statement represented by default logic in a knowledge base being updated. Next, new and revised inferential patterns are introduced and illustrated. These patterns permit to derive new default rules and to construct new linguistic expressions from previous ones. The forthcoming works include:
(1) The extension and investigation of those linguistic expressions that can be represented by default logic.
(2) A formal characterization of contextual situations where default logic can (or must) be used, permitting thus the specification of contextual semantic compositional rules, coherent with the representation defined in [saint-Dizier 86].
(3) The establishment of a link with the logic of presuppositions.
(4) The integration of default logic into other formal theories of natural language semantics, in particular into the framework of Situations Semantics [Barwise and Perry 83] Vol. 25-2, 1984. 
